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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ASHE v. SWENSON:
A NEW LOOK AT DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In the recent case of Ashe v. Swenson,' the United States
Supreme Court decided that collateral estoppel is embodied
within the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy. This decision modifies an earlier case, Hoag v. New
Jersey,2 in which the Court held that the applicability of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel was a matter for state court
determination limited only by the concepts of due process
and fundamental fairness. The intervening ruling in Benton
v. Maryland3 presented to the Ashe Court the question wheth-
er collateral estoppel was included in the fifth amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy.
In Ashe, the Court ruled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is a part of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment rather than a discretionary doctrine under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. So, while
reaffirming Benton, the Ashe Court made the doctrine of
collateral estoppel mandatory for state courts through the
fourteenth amendment.
In Ashe, the Court necessarily was dealing with the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel because of the particular facts
1 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
2 356 U.S. 464 (1958). Hoag presented a similar fact situation-
a conviction at a second trial after an acquittal at the first
trial; each trial involving different victims of one robbery.
However, the Hoag Court, influenced by Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), held that the states could still
exercise a wide degree of latitude in the administration
of their own system of criminal justice; and as long as
fundamental fairness was observed, their decisions would
not be overturned.
3 395 U.S. 784 (1969). This case overruled Palko holding that
the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
[Vol. 7, No. 1
1
Edmiston: Ashe v. Swenson: A New Look at Double Jeopardy
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1971
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
presented by the case. Ashe, along with three other men, was
accused of robbing six poker players in the basement of one
of the victims' homes. Each of the men were charged with
seven separate offenses-the armed robbery of each of the
six men and the theft of a get-away car.
At Ashe's first trial, he was charged with the armed
robbery of one of the poker players. The proof established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime had occurred. How-
ever, testimony from the state's witnesses was too indefinite
and unconvincing to identify Ashe as one of the robbers. Ashe
was found not guilty.
Six weeks later, Ashe was tried for the robbery of an-
other of the poker players. Claiming that he was being twice
put in jeopardy, Ashe filed a motion to dismiss; but the motion
was overruled. At the second trial, the prosecutor did not call
the witness who failed to identify Ashe at the first trial. In-
stead, he called those witnesses whose testimony had been
strongest against Ashe and elicited even more positive identi-
fication testimony than he had gotten at the first trial. As
could be expected, the second jury found Ashe guilty and
sentenced him to 35 years in the state penitentiary.
Ashe's second conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Missouri 4 A later petition for relief was also denied
by the state courts.5 Ashe next attempted a habeas corpus
proceeding in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Missouri on the ground that the second trial
placed him twice in jeopardy. The district court, relying on
Hoag v. New Jersey8 denied the writ.7 Also relying on Hoag,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.8 In
4 State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. 1961).
1 State v. Ashe, 403 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1966).
o 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
7 Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affd,
399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968); rev'd, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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affirming, the court of appeals expressed clearly their hope
that Ashe would be reviewed and that, in doing so, the Su-
preme Court would re-examine their own decision in Hoag.
In criminal prosecutions, the doctrine of either res judicata
or collateral estoppel acts as a bar to being twice put in jeo-
pardy. As is apparent from the many law journal articles
and essays written discussing these two doctrines, there is
some confusion as to which would be the more appropriate
doctrine in relation to a certain fact situation.0
Disregarding the confusion surrounding the proper appli-
cation of res judicata and collateral estoppel, to most courts,
the essential determination is to insure that a defendant is
not "twice put in jeopardy" for the "same offense". 10 The
courts encounter much difficulty in determining what consti-
tutes the same offense. In determining what is the "same
offense", the courts apply several tests. As with most rules of
construction or interpretation, the court's decision will be
determined by which particular test is used. One test will lead
to one result, while another equally permissible test will lead
to the opposite conclusion.'1
Confined to the circumstances presented in Ashe, multiple
crimes arising out of the same transaction, generally two tests
are applied- the "same evidence" test and the "same trans-
9 See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965);
Comment, Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in
C imes Arising from the Same Transaction, 24 Mo. L. REv.
513 (1959); Luger, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res
Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317 (1954); McLaren, The Doctrine
of Res Judicata as Applied to the Trial of Criminal Cases,
10 WASH. L. REv. 198 (1935); Comment, Statutory Implemen-
tation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life For a Mori-
bund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
10 Luger, supra note 9, at 318.
11 Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes Arising
from the Same Transaction, supra note 5, at 515-16.
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action" test.12 Applied to circumstances similar to those
presented in Ashe, opposite conclusions could be reached
depending on which test is followed. The "same evidence" test
would bar a second prosecution requiring the same evidence
which would have been required to convict at the first prose-
cution. In other words, if the same evidence would be required
to sustain a conviction in any subsequent litigation, then that
subsequent litigation is prohibited.13 The "same transaction"
test classifies as the same offense all acts which grow out of the
same criminal episode. The same transaction test limits piece-
meal prosecution by forcing the state to prosecute at one trial
all offenses committed with a common motivating intent and
aimed at a single ultimate goal.14
Applied to the Ashe case, the "same evidence" test would
not prohibit seven separate prosecutions in seven different
trials because additional evidence would be necessary to prove
robbery of different property from six different victims and
theft of the get-away car. Therefore, the prosecutor could
have taken Ashe to trial seeking conviction after conviction
and punishment after punishment for a crime which, to Ashe,
was essentially one criminal offense.
An application of the "same transaction" test, however,
necessarily would result in a different conclusion. The State
would have only one shot at convicting Ashe of this robbery.
Since he had been acquitted in the first trial, he would no
longer be subject to prosecution based on this criminal epi-
sode.
12 Id. at 515.
13 Id.; see The King v. Vandercomb, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.1.
1796) for a discussion on the origin of the single evidence
rule.
14 Luger, supra note 9, at 323; State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474,
106 A. 416 (1919); State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 375 (1833)
see Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 116, 17 S.E.2d. 573, 578 (1941)
for a critical analysis of the same transaction test in rela-
tion to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
1971]
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The Supreme Court did not consider the question to be
the number of times the State could place Ashe in jeopardy
for this single transaction. Instead, the Court recognized the
clear applicability of the rule of collateral estoppel to this
situation. The Court said:
The question is not whether Missouri could validly
charge the petitioner with six separate offenses for
the robbery of the six poker players.... It is simply
whether, after a jury determined by its verdict that
the petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State
could constitutionally hale him before a new jury to
litigate that issue again.15
The collateral estoppel doctrine bars any re-litigation of an
issue between the same parties or their privies in a second trial
after the issue has been ultimately determined in their favor
at the first trial.16 Looking at the particular facts of the Ashe
case, the Court concluded that the only conceivable issue in
dispute before the second jury was whether Ashe had been
one of the robbers. And, since the first jury had determined
he was not, then the second prosecution was wholly impermis-
sible. Because that issue had been determined in Ashe's favor
at the first trial, it was closed and could not be re-litigated in
a subsequent trial.
The Ashe decision has made more liberal the application
of the collateral estoppel doctrine by saying that it would no
longer be limited in its application to the "hypertechnical and
archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with
realism and rationality."'17 This liberal application will require
reviewing courts to consider the entire record of the first
11 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 (1970); see Sealfon v.
United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1914); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897);
United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943).
16 See Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes
Arising from the Same Transaction, supra note 9, at 523.
17 397 U.S. at 444.
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trial to determine whether the first jury could have based
its verdict upon any issue other than the one which the de-
fendant claims was the only issue in actual dispute at the first
trial.'8 By adopting this standard, the Court lessens one of
the difficulties of the doctrine- the problem of deciding what
issues have been foreclosed by the first jury's verdict. 9
As a result of the Ashe decision, collateral estoppel is
embodied within the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy and, under the Benton v. Maryland20 decision, is
made a mandatory policy to be followed by state courts. It
may now be concluded as a practical rule that: (1) whenever
an accused commits a multiple crime during the same criminal
episode for which the prosecutor chooses to try him with a
separate trial for each victim; and (2) the jury at the first
trial acquits the accused finding the only conceivable issue in
dispute in favor of the accused, then that issue once finally
determined cannot be re-litigated in a subsequent trial against
the accused.21
Ashe v. Swenson, 2 represents an extension of a just and
useful doctrine, long recognized by federal and state courts as
beneficial in both civil and criminal litigation, beyond the
arbitrary limits of "fundamental fairness" into a more precise
and practical field of constitutional rights guaranteed to all
through the fourteenth amendment.
Robert Ruyle Edmiston
18 397 U.S. at 444.
19 For a study of early common law pleadings and their effect
on double jeopardy, see Statutory Implementation of Double
Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional
Guarantee, supra note 9, at 339-44.
20 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
21 Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes Arising
from the Same Transaction, supra note 9, at 523-24.
22 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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